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Abstract: An individual who donates service to a nonprofit organization raises
unsettled questions of that volunteer’s status under tort and labor law. Cryptic
legislative language and inconsistent judicial precedent undermine predictabil-
ity for volunteers and nonprofit managers alike, and the standards fail to reflect
a coherent balance between the legitimate expectations of altruistic workers and
the realities of the nonprofit-volunteer relationship.
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Millions of Americans volunteer each year, contributing billions of dollars in
unpaid service, (Corporation for National and Community Service 2014), but
this service can sometimes go horribly awry. Unpaid workers might be sexually
harassed or discriminated against based on their race, sex, disability, or other
duty-irrelevant characteristic. Other times, volunteers might hurt clients, other
workers, or themselves, giving rise to a complicated set of rules for assigning
liability between the organization and the volunteer. And sometimes, labor
thought to be freely given may implicate minimum wage and maximum hour
rules. How these laws apply to charitable volunteers is clouded by cryptic
legislative language and inconsistent judicial precedent, undermining predict-
ability for volunteers and nonprofit managers alike. Even worse, the standards
fail to reflect policy judgment that balances the legitimate expectations of
altruistic workers against the realities of the nonprofit-volunteer relationship.
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1 “Employee” Protection Laws: Should Volunteers
Be Covered?
Employees in the United States enjoy a range of protections from federal and state
law, including laws prohibiting discrimination, harassment, or retaliation, rules
prescribing wages and hours, insurance requirements, and employer mandates to
provide safe working environments. Whether a worker is covered under most of
these diverse rules depends on whether that person is an “employee,” unhelpfully
defined as, “an individual employed by an employer,” (29 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (Title VII
of Civil Rights Act); 29 U.S.C. § 203(e) (Fair Labor Standards Act)). The Supreme
Court has criticized this definition as “completely circular and explain[ing] noth-
ing,” (Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992)), but it could
actually be worse: the National Labor Relations Act explains, somewhat incredibly,
that “[a]n ‘employee’ includes an employee,” (29 U.S.C. § 152(3)). Implementing
agencies have issued informal guidance but not binding rules, leaving decisions
about these laws’ application to unpaid workers to fact-specific judicial rulings.
Courts have coalesced around one of two approaches when determining
whether a volunteer is an employee (Rubinstein 2006). One set of courts ask
whether the volunteer is under the control of a nonprofit within the meaning of
an ancient 10-factor “master-servant” test most commonly used to distinguish
employees from independent contractors (Bryson v. Middlefield Volunteer Fire
Dep’t, Inc., 656 F.3d 348, 352 (6th Cir. 2011)). Under this test, it doesn’t matter if
the worker is paid or expects to be paid (Restatement (Second) of Agency § 225). The
second judicial approach uses this same master-servant test of organizational
control, but only after applying a threshold requirement that the individual have
the expectation of compensation (Juino v. Livingston Parish Fire Dist. No. 5, 717 F.3d
431 (5th Cir. 2013); Restatement (Third) of Employment Law § 1.02 (Draft April
2014)). The threshold compensation test is easy to meet – insurance and training
offered to the volunteer can be enough; even free use of a golf cart has been found to
qualify – leading many decisions to hinge on the same control-based test.1
By puzzling over whether a volunteer is “employed by an employer,” we are
not asking the right question. The master-servant test of organizational control
maps onto the nonprofit-volunteer relationship awkwardly and unpredictably,
1 California, Illinois, New York, and Washington DC recently adopted legislation explicitly
prohibiting discrimination against and harassment of “unpaid interns,” somewhat myopically
defined. California went beyond the intern to protect all “volunteers” from sexual harassment
(Cal. Govt Code 12490). Other states considered but declined to enact similar legislation.
Although these debates in the state legislatures focus on the unpaid intern, they are beginning
a conversation about discrimination against and rights of unpaid workers more generally.
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failing to provide guidance to organizations and workers about their rights and
obligations. Much worse, we are failing to ask and answer the difficult questions
about whether and when the law should guarantee charitable volunteers free-
dom from discrimination and harassment. Volunteers might not lose a pay-
check, but they do suffer real injury when they are discriminated against or
harassed during their volunteering. It degrades the value of volunteering and
the dignity of the volunteer to ignore this injury simply because it is not
financial. On the other hand, it can be difficult to quantify the unpaid worker’s
injury, and worries about ensuring compliance may push some nonprofits to
reduce demand for casual volunteers. More controversially, extending protec-
tions against discrimination into the realm of voluntary behavior may precipitate
a clash between nonprofits’ diverse religious and ideological preferences and
society’s interests in eradicating odious discrimination. (Nelson 2015; Boy Scouts
of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)).
2 Beyond Discrimination: Volunteer Liabilities
and Immunities
The nature of the nonprofit-volunteer relationship has implications well beyond
employee protection laws. Federal and state legislation provides immunity from
many types of liability to volunteers, if they are acting within the scope of their
duties to a nonprofit organization (Groble and Brudney 2015; Horwitz and Mead
2009; Martinez 2003). At the same time, state law holds the organization respon-
sible for the misdeeds of volunteers acting within the scope of their responsibilities,
and this liability is not changed by volunteer immunity laws (Kahn 1985). In fact,
organizational liability and volunteer immunity are linked: if the volunteer is
immune, that implies he is acting for an organization that would then be vicariously
responsible (Popper 1998, 132). To decide if the nonprofit-volunteer relationship is
sufficient to lead to organizational liability and volunteer immunity, courts use the
master-servant test of organizational control – the identical test used in the
employee context.
3 Conclusions and Implications
Consider how current standards might play out in a plausible volunteer situation,
based loosely on allegations from a recent case (Marie v. Am. Red Cross, 771 F.3d
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344, 349 (6th Cir. 2014)). For several years, a volunteer spent one day a week
alongside paid staff helping the nonprofit further its mission by performing various
office tasks and responding to disasters. She did not expect a paycheck, but she did
receive a number of meaningful personal benefits: training, workers’ compensation
and life insurance, a chance to meet people in her community, and the joy that
comes from helping others. Should this volunteer have a legal right to be protected
from discrimination and harassment at her unpaid position? Should this volunteer
be entitled to a minimum wage? Should this volunteer be immune for simple
mistakes made in the course of her service under volunteer immunity legislation?
Paradoxically, under existing law, the answer to all of these questions is the same,
or, at least, dependent on the same inquiry into organizational control. Yet different
courts will apply the test of organizational control in different ways despite similar
facts, meaning the nonprofit and the volunteer will not know of their rights and
duties until the matter is brought to court.
It need not be this way. First, brighter lines and clearer rules would benefit
nonprofit organizations and volunteers alike. Existing legislative ambiguities
and inconsistent, fact-specific judicial decisions make it difficult for nonprofits
to ensure that they are complying with the law when they use volunteers, and
for volunteers to accurately assess their risks.
Second, the lawmust decouple the extent of various volunteer protections from
one another. Simply because a volunteer is covered by one set of protections, say
immunity (which is explicitly dependent on the volunteer working without com-
pensation), should not imply that the volunteer is also covered by minimum wage
protections (which would inconsistently require that the volunteer receive compen-
sation). Different interests are at stake, and each track should be developed sepa-
rately without being bound to the clumsy master-servant test.
Third, the development of policy towards volunteers should be done con-
sciously and deliberately to allow for full deliberation and balancing of the
values of individual dignity, organizational autonomy, and the realities of
volunteer management. The millions who volunteer each year, and the organi-
zations and communities that they serve, deserve at least that.
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